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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to study the joint determination of gender differentials in labor market
outcomes and in the household division of labor. Specifically, we explore the hypothesis that incentive
problems in the labor market amplify differences in earnings due to gender differentials in home hours.
In turn, earnings differentials reinforce the division of labor within the household, leading to a potentially
self-fulfilling feedback mechanism. The workings of the labor market are key in our story.  The main
assumptions are that the utility cost of work effort is increasing in home hours, and that higher effort
should correspond to higher incentive pay.  Household decisions are Pareto efficient, leading to a negative
correlation between relative home hours and earnings across spouses.  We use the Census and the
PSID to study these predictions and find that they are supported by the data.
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One important fact about women in the labor market is the substantial and persistent gender
earnings gap. O￿ Neill (2003) shows that there is still a 10% di⁄erential in female and male
wages in the U.S. in 2000 that remains unexplained by gender di⁄erences in schooling, actual
experience and job characteristics. Moreover, there is a substantial gender di⁄erence in home
hours. PSID data for the period 1976-2001 show that husbands￿home hours are roughly one
third of wives￿and that this di⁄erence is stable over time.1
The purpose of this paper is to study the joint determination of gender di⁄erentials in
earnings and in the household division of labor. Speci￿cally, we explore the hypothesis that
incentive problems in the labor market amplify di⁄erences in earnings due to gender di⁄erentials
in home hours. In turn, gender earnings di⁄erentials reinforce the division of labor within the
household, leading to a potentially self-ful￿lling feedback mechanism. The workings of the labor
market are key in our story. Firms and workers negotiate over earnings. The main assumptions
are that the utility cost of work e⁄ort is increasing in home hours, as in Becker (1985), and
that e⁄ort as well as home hours are private information. In an extension of Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991), ￿rms o⁄er incentive compatible labor contracts that are constrained-e¢ cient.
Under the optimal contracts workers￿earnings and e⁄ort are inversely related to home hours,
and higher e⁄ort corresponds to higher incentive pay. Households value a public home good
produced with time of both spouses. Household decisions are Pareto e¢ cient, so that the
allocation of home hours only depends on the spouses￿relative earnings.
The incentive problems in the labor market amplify gender di⁄erentials in earnings due to
di⁄erences in home hours, while earnings di⁄erentials across genders reinforce the division of
labor within the household. The gender gap in earnings is larger than any initial di⁄erence in
productivity across genders. Even when productivity in home and market work across genders
is the same, gendered equilibria are possible when ￿rms believe that home hours are di⁄erent for
female and male workers. If, for example, ￿rms believe that home hours are higher for women,
they will o⁄er them labor contracts with lower earnings and e⁄ort. Then, the opportunity cost
of home hours is lower for women and wives will allocate more time to home production, thus
con￿rming ￿rms￿beliefs. Ungendered equilibria occur when ￿rms perceive home hours to be
the same for female and male workers, leading to equal earning opportunities and a symmetric
division of home production across genders.
The model can also provide an explanation for the persistence of the gender wage gap. If
women￿ s comparative advantage in home production, re￿ ecting their ability to bear children, is
high enough, the only equilibrium is one in which women devote more time to home production
and have lower earnings. Assume this equilibrium corresponds to the US economy circa 1900.
The subsequent advances in obstetric practices and medical knowledge, as well as the introduc-
tion of bottle feeding, arguably led to a substantial decline in women￿ s comparative advantage.
In our model, the incentive problems in the labor market imply that the decline in the gender
earnings gap will be smaller than the decline in women￿ s comparative advantage in home work.
Moreover, the self-ful￿lling nature of equilibria when women￿ s comparative advantage is small
1Authors￿calculation based on the PSID that update evidence reported in Kristin and Rupert (1995).
2enough implies that the shift to an ungendered equilibrium may never occur.
Our environment features a representative household and a representative ￿rm, so we do
not generate predictions on sorting by gender across industries or occupations. Yet, we can
interpret contracts specifying di⁄erent levels of e⁄ort as corresponding to di⁄erent positions
or jobs within a ￿rm. The severity of the incentive problem is related, in our model, to the
variance of observable measures of performance conditional on worker￿ s e⁄ort. We posit that
this varies across occupations. This constitutes the basis for the link between the theoretical
and the empirical analysis in our paper. Then, our model delivers several predictions about
gender di⁄erentials in earnings and the structure of compensation across occupations. First,
gender earning di⁄erentials should be higher in occupations in which the incentive problem
is more severe. This e⁄ect is stronger when the di⁄erences in home hours between women
and men is greater. Relatedly, di⁄erences in incentive pay between male and female workers
should be inversely related to the gender di⁄erential in earnings, since both are driven by the
variation of the severity of the incentive problem. Since the gender di⁄erence in home hours
is smaller for single workers, the link between gender earnings di⁄erentials and the severity of
the incentive problem should be weaker for single workers, all else equal.
We exploit a variety of data sources to support these predictions. We use Census data for
year 2000 to study aggregate gender earnings di⁄erentials by marital status across industries
and for three broad occupational categories: management, sales and production. We argue
that incentive problems are most stringent in management and sales. Managers have a wide
range of responsibilities, hence, the uncertainty associated with their performance, given their
e⁄ort should be greater than for workers in production occupations. Similarly, sales volumes
depend to a large degree on variables that are not directly related to sales personnel￿ s e⁄ort.
These considerations are less important for production workers. We ￿nd that gender di⁄eren-
tials in earnings are greater for married workers than for single workers in all industries and
occupations, controlling for age and education. Moreover, gender di⁄erentials in earnings are
greatest in management and sales occupations for married workers relative to never married
workers, while gender earnings di⁄erentials do not vary greatly by marital status for production
workers, consistently with our model.
Since the Census does not include information on the structure of earnings, we use PSID
data from the late 1990s to document the negative relation between the male/female di⁄er-
ence in the fraction of incentive pay and the female/male earnings ratio. We ￿nd a negative
and signi￿cant correlation between the two ratios across occupations. Moreover, di⁄erences
in incentive pay account for 10 to 21% of the gender earnings di⁄erential for management
occupations, and 6% for sales occupations. This evidence provides additional support for our
Census ￿ndings, since incentive pay is used more in those occupations where the incentive
problem is more severe, as discussed in MacLeod and Parent (2003). In a cross-section of
married couples from the PSID, we also ￿nd a negative correlation between the wife/husband
ratio of home hours and the wife/husband ratio of earnings, and a positive correlation between
the hours ratio and the husband-wife di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay. These ￿ndings
as consistent with our model￿ s prediction.
Our model bridges three literatures: the literature on the sexual division of labor in the
3Beckerian tradition; the one on incentive contracts and job design, as in Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991); and ￿nally the literature on statistical discrimination, as in Coate and Loury
(1993). The centerpiece of our model is to identify the source of statistical discrimination with
the incentive problem on the labor market.
Two recent papers also argue that statistical discrimination may give rise to gender earnings
di⁄erentials. Francois (1998) also presents a model in which equilibria with gender wage
di⁄erentials are self-ful￿lling. His result relies on three ingredients. The ￿rst is exogenously
given job heterogeneity. Only one class of jobs is subject to incentive problems, leading to
an e¢ ciency wage arrangement. Earnings are higher in the e¢ ciency wage jobs and only in
those jobs do ￿rms gain from gender discrimination since this ameliorates an adverse selection
problem due to private information about the type of job held by a worker￿ s spouse. In an
equilibrium with female wage discrimination, the e¢ ciency wage jobs are assigned to men only.
The second key ingredient is to restrict the labor contracts space so that ￿rms in the sector with
incentive problems do not have the opportunity to o⁄er incentive compatible contracts that
would allow workers to self-select based on the type of job held by their spouse. This implies
that gender discrimination is the only way for ￿rms to address the adverse selection problem.
Finally, home production requires household speci￿c human capital. This generates exogenous
gains from specialization in home production and implies that the only e¢ cient equilibria are
the ones with discrimination, since the spouses specialize. In our model, we do not restrict the
labor contract space in any way, and there are no built in gains from specialization. Instead,
the degree of specialization is determined in equilibrium as a function of the endogenous gender
wage di⁄erential. Both these features make it harder for statistical discrimination to obtain.
Most importantly, in Francois￿ s model the female wage di⁄erential stems from job segregation.
If both men and women were allowed to operate in the e¢ ciency wage sector, the gender wage
gap would be reversed in that sector. Hence, his model cannot account for gender di⁄erentials
within the same occupation that we document in our empirical analysis.
Gayle and Golan (2006) formulate and structurally estimate a dynamic adverse selection
model with on the job human capital accumulation. In their framework, self-ful￿lling beliefs
about women￿ s labor force attachment lead to equilibrium gender di⁄erences in labor market
experience, earnings and occupational sorting. They quantify the e⁄ects of statistical discrim-
ination on the changes in labor market experience and the gender earnings gap between the
late 1970￿ s and the late 1980￿ s.
Our model emphasizes the importance of incentives for gender di⁄erences in earnings and
the structure of compensation. In this we build on Goldin￿ s (1986) pioneering study. She
explores the role of supervisory and monitoring costs in rationalizing aspects of occupational
segregation by gender. She argues that the prevalence of piece-rate compensation in manufac-
turing and of ￿career tracks￿in the clerical sector can both be understood in the context of a
labor market model with private information and costly monitoring, where ￿rms use gender as
a signal of labor market attachment. Goldin (1990) concludes that ￿... By segregating workers
by sex into job ladders (and some dead-end positions), ￿rms may have been better able to use
the e⁄ort-inducing and ability-revealing mechanisms of the wage structure.￿This prediction
also resonates with current debates on gender discrimination in personnel policy. For example,
4in June 2004 a federal judge ruled in favor of class-action status for the Dukes vs Wal-Mart
gender discrimination lawsuit. The ruling was based on extensive evidence presented by the
plainti⁄s, Drogin (2003), showing that women working at Wal-Mart stores face pay disparities
in most job categories, and take longer to enter management positions.2 Finally, it is also
interesting to note how expectations of a gender wage gap characterize both male and female
workers. As documented by Babcock and Laschever (2003): ￿Women report salary expecta-
tions between 3 and 32 percent lower than those of men for the same jobs; men expect to earn
13 percent more than women during their ￿rst year of full-time work and 32 percent more at
their career peaks.￿
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the results of
numerical simulations. Section 3 reports evidence supporting the model￿ s predictions. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of adult agents, ex ante identical except for gender,
and a continuum of identical ￿rms. The agents are equally divided by gender, they are all
married and belong to a household. All households are made up of two agents of di⁄erent
gender.3 There are two types of goods in this economy- a market good and a home good.
Individual utility is increasing in consumption of the market and home goods and decreasing
in the number of hours worked at home and in the e⁄ort applied to market work. Households
combine the market good and home hours of each spouse to produce the home good, which
is household speci￿c and public within each household. Each household e¢ ciently chooses the
allocation of home hours across spouses. Firms produce the market good using labor as the
only input. Each agent is employed by a ￿rm and each ￿rm hires a continuum of workers. On
the labor market, each ￿rm and individual worker negotiate labor contracts. Following Becker
(1985), we posit that an agent￿ s utility cost of e⁄ort is increasing in home hours. We also assume
that agents￿home hours and e⁄ort are not observed by ￿rms. Then, ￿rms face adverse selection
and moral hazard when contracting with workers. Firms will o⁄er incentive compatible labor
contracts that maximize the surplus from the employment relationship subject to incentive
compatibility constraints stemming from the private information. Individual agents￿labor
market outcomes will depend on their home hours, which are chosen at the household level.
On the other hand, an household￿ s e¢ cient choice of home hours will depend on the spouses
relative earnings, which are determined on the labor market. Hence, there is a feedback from
household decisions to labor market outcomes. Since all ￿rms, and all households are identical,
we can consider the behavior of a representative ￿rm and a representative household.
2Discrimination lawsuits based on analogous complaints where ￿led by a team of women brokers at Merrill
Lynch and by women researchers working at Rand corporation during the summer of 2004. See The New York
Times, August 22, 2004 and The New York Times, September 5, 2004, respectively.
3Since the purpose of this paper is to study the joint determination of gender di⁄erentials in labor market
outcomes and in the household division of labor, we abstract from modelling marriage decisions and concentrate
on married couples. See Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) for a version of the model that includes a labor force
participation decision.
5We now describe the optimal labor contract and the household decision problem in detail,
and present our de￿nition of equilibrium.
2.1 Labor Contracts
On the labor market, the representative ￿rm hires agents to produce output. The output of
one agent is related to her e⁄ort, according to:
y = f (e) + !; (1)
The function f (e) denotes expected output; where f is strictly increasing; twice continuously
di⁄erentiable and weakly concave. The random variable ! is distributed normally with zero
mean and variance ￿2 > 0:
Each agent has a utility function:
U (c;h;e) = ￿exp(￿￿ [c ￿ v (h;e)]) + ￿logG; (2)
where c is individual consumption of the market good, h denotes home hours; e denotes e⁄ort
applied to market work, and G is consumption of the home good. We adopt a CARA speci￿-
cation for utility over private market consumption, home hours and e⁄ort. The coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion is ￿ > 0, and v (￿) denotes the disutility of market and home work, where
h 2 R+ and e 2 [0;1]. The function v is increasing in both its arguments, twice continuously
di⁄erentiable and satis￿es:
vhe > 0: (3)
Hence, the marginal utility cost of e⁄ort is increasing in home hours4.
The optimal labor contracts maximize the surplus from the employment relationship. We
assume that e⁄ort, e, and home hours, h; are not observed by ￿rms, while output, y; is ob-
servable. Since home hours do not in￿ uence agents￿output directly, they can be interpreted
as an agent￿ s type from the standpoint of ￿rms. Hence, the unobservability of home hours
determines an adverse selection problem, while the unobservability of e⁄ort gives rise to moral
hazard. Labor contracts will be constrained-e¢ cient, since ￿rms will be subject to incentive
compatibility constraints.
The optimal labor contracts will specify an earnings function, w; and e⁄ort to be imple-
mented for each type of agent, h; in the population. Earnings will depend on output. This
property is required to implement strictly positive e⁄ort, given that it is private information.
Moreover, since home hours are also unobserved, the optimal menu of contracts will depend on
the ￿rms￿belief over the distribution of home hours. We characterize this distribution with its
density ￿, which is taken as given by ￿rms but will be endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Then, the optimal labor contract can be represented as a mapping, C (￿) = fw;eg(h); where
h is understood to belong to the support of ￿: Condition (3) is the analogue of a single crossing
condition. It ensures that, given that contracts are incentive compatible, agents with home
hours h will self-select into the appropriate contract in the menu implied by C (￿):
4See Albanesi and Olivetti (2005) for a version of the model with variable market hours giving rise to similar
predictions.
6It is important to note that gender is observable, so ￿rms can o⁄er di⁄erent contracts to
female and male workers. However, since the contract space is unrestricted, ￿rms will ￿nd it
optimal to do so if and only if they believe that the distribution of home hours di⁄ers across
genders.
To elucidate the role of our informational assumptions in the determination of labor market
outcomes, we derive the properties of constrained-e¢ cient labor contracts when home hours are
observable ￿rst, and then consider the case in which home hours are also private information.
If ￿rms observe home hours but e⁄ort is not observable, they only face a moral hazard
problem. The representative ￿rm will choose labor contracts to solve:
max
fw(y);eg;e2[0;1]
S (e;h) (Problem F1)
subject to
e = arg max
e2[0;1]
E [U (c;h;e)]; (4)
where the objective function is the expected surplus from the employment relationship, and
(4) is the incentive compatibility constraint associated with moral hazard.5 As shown in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), CARA utility implies that, without loss of generality, we can
restrict attention to earnings functions of the form: w(y) = ￿ w + ~ wy: We refer to ￿ w and ~ wy as
salary and incentive pay, respectively. This implies that under CARA, the expected surplus
from the employment relationship corresponds to the certainly equivalent given by:
S (e;h) = f (e) ￿ v (h;e) ￿ ￿￿2 ( ~ w)
2 =2: (5)
The ￿rst term is expected output, the second term is the utility cost of working, given home
hours h: The last term corresponds to the utility cost of stochastic earnings, a property of the
contract that stems from the need to provide incentives by making earnings depend on output,
y: To implement e > 0; ￿rms must set ~ w > 0; which implies that earnings are stochastic and
reduces the surplus from the employment relationship, since workers are risk averse. Given the
CARA assumption on preferences, the incentive compatibility constraint simpli￿es to:
e = arg max
e2[0;1]
~ wf (e) ￿ v (h;e): (6)
We can use the ￿rst order approach and replace (6) with the following:
~ wf0 (e) = ve (h;e); (7)
~ wf00 (e) ￿ vee (h;e) ￿ 0: (8)
Since we assume f00 ￿ 0 and vee > 0; (8) will automatically be satis￿ed. The salary component
of earnings does not in￿ uence workers￿incentives to exert e⁄ort. We impose a zero pro￿t
condition on ￿rms, which implies ￿ w = y (1 ￿ ~ w) and w = y:
5Consumption of the home good is irrelevant for incentive compatibility given that utility is separable between
market and home goods. Hence, we can ignore it for Problem F1 and Problem F2 below.
7To obtain analytical solutions, we will restrict attention to the following functional forms:
f (e) = e; (9)




The parameter   > 0 can be interpreted as a ￿xed cost of working on the market.
Proposition 1 The optimal labor contract with observed home hours satis￿es:
e￿ (h) =
1
(  + h)(1 + ￿￿2 (  + h))
; (11)
~ w￿ (h) = (  + h)e￿: (12)
In addition, expected earnings are given by Ew￿ (h) = f (e￿ (h)); with Ew￿0 (h) < 0 and
Ew￿00 (h) > 0:
Proof. In Appendix.
The optimal e⁄ort level and the fraction of incentive pay are decreasing in h; since the
marginal utility cost of e⁄ort is increasing in home hours. Hence, expected total earnings, w;
will also be decreasing in home hours. E⁄ort and the fraction of incentive pay also decrease
with risk aversion, ￿; and with the parameter ￿; which represents the variance of a worker￿ s
output for given e⁄ort. High values of ￿ make it harder for ￿rms to provide incentives for high
e⁄ort.
If both home hours and e⁄ort are unobserved, this introduces additional constraints on the
optimal contract, which we refer to as the adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints.
Adverse selection implies that the type of workers for which such constraint is binding will ex-
tract an informational rent; which reduces the surplus generated from the employment relation
and may reduce the level of e⁄ort that can be implemented. The incentive compatibility con-
straints imply that workers will self-select the contract on the menu appropriate to their level
of home hours.
We describe the ￿rms￿problem under the assumption that home hours can only take on
two values and h 2 fhL;hHg with hL < hH; respectively, with ￿ (hj) = 0:5 for j = L;H; since
this is the only distribution of home hours that can occur in equilibrium in our model, as we
prove in section 2.3. The information rent is denoted with Tj; j = L;H: The representative
￿rm takes hL, hH and ￿ (￿) as given, but the support of the home hours distribution will be
determined from the optimal equilibrium behavior of the representative household.














~ wjf0 (ej) = ve (hj;ej) (13)
f (^ ei) ~ wi ￿ v (hj; ^ ei) ￿ ￿￿2 ~ w2
i
2




f0 (^ ei) ~ wi = ve (hj; ^ ei); (15)
8for j = L;H; where ^ ei denotes the level of e⁄ort chosen by an agent of type j when she
untruthfully reports to be of type i: If the distribution of home hours is degenerate so that
￿ (hL) = 1 or ￿ (hH) = 1; then this problem collapses to Problem F1
The properties of the optimal labor contracts depends on the pattern of binding adverse
selection incentive compatibility constraints and are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A) For 1 < ￿￿2 (  + hL) <
￿
 +hH
 +hL + 1
￿
0:5; the adverse selection incentive
compatibility constraint is binding for workers with low home hours. Then:
~ wL =
1
(  + hL)2￿￿2; eL =
~ wL
(  + hL)
; (16)
~ wH =
(  + hL)
(2  + hH + hL)
; eH =
~ wH










(  + hL)
￿ ￿￿2
￿
, TH = 0: (18)






; the adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraint will be binding for workers with high home hours. Then:
~ wL =
  + hH
2  + hH + hL
;eL =
~ wL




2￿￿2 (  + hH)
; eH =
~ wH
(  + hH)
; (20)
TL = 0; TH = 0:5
￿
1








C) For 1 ￿ ￿￿2 (  + hL) and 1 ￿ ￿￿2 (  + hH), the adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraint will not be binding. Then:
~ wj = ~ w￿ (hj); ej = e￿ (hj); Tj = 0; for j = L;H; (22)
where ~ w￿ (￿) and e￿ (￿) are de￿ned in (12) and (11), respectively.
Proof. In Appendix.
This proposition illustrates that three possible scenarios can arise. If utility is decreasing
in ~ wj for both j; which corresponds to case A), the adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraint is binding for workers with low home hours. Then, TL > 0 and ~ wH > ~ wL: In
case B), utility for both types of workers is increasing in ~ wj and the adverse selection incentive
compatibility constraint is binding for workers with high home hours. This leads to TH > 0 and
~ wL > ~ wH: In case C), utility is increasing in ~ wL for types with low home hours and decreasing
in ~ wH for types with high home hours. Hence, the adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraints will not be binding and the optimal menu of labor contracts corresponds to the
one in which home hours are observed.
Cases A) and B) can only arise if the di⁄erence between high and low home hours, hH ￿hL;
is large enough. They feature an additional ine¢ ciency due to the binding adverse selection
9incentive compatibility constraint. It can be easily veri￿ed that in both case A) and B),
eL < e￿ (hL) and ~ wL < ~ w￿ (hL); while eH > e￿ (hH) and ~ w￿ (hH) < ~ wH; where e￿ (￿) and ~ w(￿)
are the optimal e⁄ort and fraction of incentive pay when home hours are observed. Hence,
private information on home hours reduces e⁄ort for the worker with low home hours and
increases e⁄ort for the worker with high home hours. This enables ~ wL ￿ ~ wH to be lower than
~ w￿ (hL)￿ ~ w￿ (hH) and relaxes the adverse selection incentive compatibility constraint and the
corresponding informational rent. While in both case A) and B), it is the case that eL > eH;
there is a misallocation with respect to levels of e⁄ort implemented by the optimal contract
when home hours are known.
The labor contracting environment described above parsimoniously embeds elements of
job design and of optimal compensation policy. The incentive pay component in the optimal
earnings schedule is consistent with a variety of widely used compensation schemes, since the
variable y can be interpreted as an observable measure of performance. For example, for sales
workers, y corresponds to volume of sales, and ~ w represents the optimal commission rate.
For management position, y may stand for pro￿ts corresponding to a unit or division under
a manager￿ s supervision. Then, ~ w captures the dependence of the manager￿ s total earnings
on this observable measure of performance. For production workers, y corresponds to units
of output produced, while ~ w is the piece-rate. As discussed in Milgrom and Roberts (1992),
bonuses received by workers in addition to their basic salary are most often implicitly or
explicitly linked to observable performance. Hence, ~ wy can be interpreted as a bonus, the size
of which, depends on output. In addition, a menu of contracts in which one speci￿es high
e⁄ort and one speci￿es low e⁄ort can be interpreted as two di⁄erent jobs or positions within a
￿rm.
2.2 Households
The representative household is endowed with wealth a: The amount of household wealth at-
tributed to each spouse with si; for i = f;m; where f; m stand for female and male, respectively:
The production function for the home public good is
G = g (hf;hm;k); (23)
where k is the amount of market good used in home production. We restrict attention to
speci￿cations in which hf and hm are substitutes. We assume that g is increasing in each
argument and concave.
The representative household and the representative individuals take as given the price
of the market good and the mapping between individual home hours, earnings and e⁄ort,
conditional on gender, implied by the labor contracts o⁄ered by ￿rms. We denote the set of
labor contracts o⁄ered with Ci (￿i) = fw￿
i;e￿
ig(h); i = f;m; where the functions w￿
i and e￿
i
satisfy Problem F2. The incentive compatibility constraints in the ￿rms￿problem imply that
individual optimality of market consumption and e⁄ort for given home hours is satis￿ed for
each spouse for given hi and also si; due to the CARA speci￿cation of preferences. We can
10then de￿ne the following individual indirect utility function:
Vi (si;hi;C) = EU (si + w￿
i (hi);hi;e￿
i (hi)); (24)
for i = f;m; from the solution of Problem F2. The households solve the following problem is
to choose G;k hi and si to maximize:
X
i=f;m
￿iVi (si;hi;C) + ￿log(G); (Problem H)
subject to (23), hf;hm ￿ 0;
si + w￿
i (hi) ￿ 0 for i = f;m; (25)
X
i
si + k = a + ￿: (26)
The parameters, ￿i; for i = f;m; represent the weight of each spouse in household decisions.
Note that since si can be negative, this means that individual labor earnings can ￿nance
purchases of the market good used in home production and can be transferred across spouses.
￿ denotes aggregate pro￿ts from the ￿rm sector, which are taken as given by the household.
Since ￿rms make zero pro￿t, ￿ = 0 in any equilibrium.
Problem H implies that household decisions are Pareto e¢ cient and is consistent with the
"collective labor supply" approach developed by Chiappori (1997)6. It follows that the optimal
allocation of home hours, which we describe below, does not depend on the Pareto weights ￿i:
Given that this is the main focus of our analysis, we do not allow the Pareto weights to depend
on additional loading factors, such as individual earnings.
2.2.1 Choice of Home Hours
The optimal allocation of home hours within the household depends on the spouses￿relative
opportunity cost of home hours and, therefore, on the prevailing labor contracts. The substi-
tutability of spousal hours in the production of the public home good implies that marginal
di⁄erences in market earnings will give rise to an allocation of home hours in which the spouse
with lower earning potential in market work devotes more time to home production: We inter-
pret the intra-household allocation of home hours as a long term arrangement of the spouses,
that may be costly to reverse in the short run.
We assume that G is produced according to the following technology:










with ￿;￿ 2 (0;1): The function H (￿) aggregates the contribution of spousal home hours to
the production of the home public good. The parameter ￿ denotes the contribution of market
6This framework is consistent with a variety of "household bargaining" models, as in McElroy and Horney
(1981) and Manser and Brown (1980). See also Bergstrom (1997) for a review.
11goods to the production of the public home good, while ￿ determines the substitutability of
spousal home hours in home production.
The optimal choice of hf; hm, k and G can be analyzed as a sequence of cost minimization
problems and is independent of the Pareto weights ￿i. The optimal values of hf and hm for
given H solve the following cost minimization problem:












for given ￿ H > 0 and given Cj (￿i) for j = f;m: Here, expectations are taken with respect to !:





















where w0 (h) denotes the derivative of total earnings with respect to home hours, which corre-
sponds to the opportunity cost of home hours: The su¢ cient conditions for optimality of the
home hours allocation is:






for j = f;m in equation (29) correspond to the opportunity cost of
home hours for each spouse and depend on labor contracts. The substitutability of spousal
hours in the production of the public home good implies that the spouse with lower opportunity
cost, will devote more time to home production: The di⁄erence in spousal home hours for
given labor contracts depends on the elasticity of substitution in H: If wf (h) = wm (h) for
all h ￿ 0; that is the same menu of labor contracts is being o⁄ered to workers of di⁄erent
gender, households are indi⁄erent over the allocation of home hours across spouses and they
will randomize.
We describe the problems for the choice of H, k and G in Appendix. The solution to the
household problem can be represented by the policy functions si (a;C); hi (a;C); k(a;C); and
G(a;C) for i = f;m:
2.3 Equilibrium
We now provide a de￿nition of equilibrium for our economy.
De￿nition 3 An equilibrium is given by beliefs ￿i (h) for i = f;m; labor contracts Ci (￿i) =
fwi (y);eig(h) for i = f;m; and policy functions for the household fG;k;hf;hm;sf;smg(a;C),
such that:
12i) Labor contracts solve Problem F2, given beliefs;
ii) Household policy functions solve the household problem, given labor contracts;
iii) The resulting distribution of home hours in the population is consistent with ￿rms￿
beliefs.
Given that individuals of di⁄erent gender are ex ante identical, the equilibrium distribution
of home hours across genders depends on ￿rms￿self-ful￿lling beliefs about this distribution.
We say that an equilibrium is gendered when ￿rms believe that the distribution of home hours
is di⁄erent for female and male workers. We say that it is ungendered otherwise. The same
selection of labor contracts will be o⁄ered to female and male workers in ungendered equilibria.
The household will be indi⁄erent over which spouse should be assigned high home hours and
they will randomize.
The following lemma shows that any equilibrium with a non-degenerate distribution of
home hours must be ungendered.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium, there will at most be two values of home hours in the population,
fhL;hHg; with 0 < hL ￿ hH: If the distribution of home hours in the population is non-
degenerate, that is ￿f (hj) 2 (0;1) and ￿m (hj) 2 (0;1) for j = H;L with hL < hH; then the
equilibrium is ungendered and ￿f (hj) = ￿m (hj) = 0:5 for j = L;H:
The proof is in the Appendix. The ￿rst result is based on the existence of a representa-
tive household, which implies that only two values of home hours will occur in a gendered
equilibrium. In an ungendered equilibrium, the representative household randomizes over the
distribution of home hours across spouses and the optimal randomization optimal strategy will
correspond to the equilibrium distribution of home hours by gender. For randomization to be
optimal, the household must be indi⁄erent over the allocation of home hours across spouses,
which requires the distribution of home hours to be the same for female and male workers.
Moreover, if there are two values of home hours in the population, the only distribution con-
sistent with an ungendered equilibrium is ￿m (hj) = ￿f (hj) = 0:5 for j = L;M. Then, in
an equilibrium with non-degenerate distribution of home hours, labor contracts solve Problem
F2.
The following proposition characterizes equilibria with a degenerate distribution of home
hours.
Proposition 5 The set of equilibria with degenerate distribution of home hours uniquely in-
cludes:
i) Two gendered equilibria, with distribution of home hours given by ￿i (hH) = 1 and
￿j (hL) = 1 for i;j = f;m and i 6= j;






= 1 for some ￿ h > 0:
In gendered equilibria, the distribution of home hours is di⁄erent for male and female
workers. By Lemma 4, all such equilibria have a degenerate distribution of home hours, with
￿f (hH) = 1 and ￿m (hL) = 1; or ￿m (hH) = 1 and ￿f (hL) = 1; where hL and hH are
13endogenously determined. Proposition 5 proves that two such equilibria exist, in addition to
an ungendered equilibrium in which all workers have the same level of home hours.
We prove proposition 5 in the Appendix. Here, we describe the argument heuristically,
since it clari￿es the feedback mechanism between labor contracts and the households￿problem.
Firms￿beliefs over the distribution of home hours shape the trade-o⁄ faced by households in
the allocation of home hours, since they determine the spouses￿relative earning potential by
gender. The representative household takes labor contracts as given and chooses home hours
based on this trade-o⁄. This, in turn, induces the e⁄ective distribution of home hours in the
population.
Given that by Lemma 4 there can be at most two values of home hours in the population, if
the representative ￿rm believes that the distribution of home hours is di⁄erent across genders,
then such a distribution will be degenerate. Hence, there will be no adverse selection and labor
contracts will solve Problem F1. To illustrate the argument, we focus on the equilibrium with
distribution given by ￿f (hH) = 1 and ￿m (hL) = 1: While in equilibrium only one contract
will be o⁄ered to female and male workers, to characterize the equilibrium, we need to allow
the household to contemplate their optimal choice of home hours for "out of equilibrium"
menus of labor contracts that satisfy the restriction, maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h): By the
properties of labor contracts derived in Propositions 1 and 2, this restriction would arise if the
representative ￿rm believes that female workers have lower home hours than male workers. For
such an equilibrium to exist, equation (29) must have a solution with hm=hf < 1. Equation
(29) is represented in ￿gure 1 for a given value of hf: The dashed line represents the right hand
side of the equation while the solid line represents the left hand side.
We prove that, generically, there are two values of the ratio hm=hf that solve this equation
for given hf: The ￿rst is hm=hf = 1; the second is a value of this ratio strictly greater than
zero and strictly smaller than 1: Given that maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h); hm=hf = 1 is
not optimal for Problem H1, because it corresponds to the maximum value of the objective.
Therefore, the solution corresponds to the crossing with hm=hf < 1. This pins down the
equilibrium ratio hm=hf = hL=hH and establishes that ￿f (hH) = 1 and ￿m (hL) = 1 is the
equilibrium distribution of home hours. The equilibrium value of hf = hH can then be derived
from equation (30) and by solving the rest of the household problem. Since Problem H1 has
a unique solution under restriction maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h); the resulting equilibrium is
unique in its class.
A similar reasoning can be used to construct the equilibrium with distribution of home
hours given by ￿f (hH) = 0 and ￿m (hL) = 0; which is characterized by the restriction on total
earnings maxEwf (h) > maxEwm (h): Equation (29) can be used to solve for hf=hm for given
hm: Since women and men have identical home and market productivity, the equilibrium values
of hL and hH will be the same in the previous equilibrium. Finally, the ungendered equilibrium
can be constructed based on the restriction Ewf (h) = Ewm (h); which implies that hf = hm






= 1; for some
￿ h > 0.
An ungendered equilibrium with non-degenerate distribution of home hours may also exist.
A non-degenerate distribution of home hours arises only if the representative household ￿nds


















Figure 1: Solutions to equation ( 48) for hf = 0:3;￿ = 0:8; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1;   = 1:
15it optimal to randomize over the allocation of home hours across spouses, which requires that
the same menu of contracts be o⁄ered to male and female workers. As shown in Lemma 4, this
can only occur if ￿f (hj) = ￿m (hj) = 0:5 for j = L;H: Then, equilibrium labor contracts will
solve Problem F2. The existence of this equilibrium requires that Ew0
H=Ew0
L < 1 and that
Ew00
L > 0; for wj; j = L;H; that satisfy Proposition 2. This can be guaranteed by appropriately
restricting the parameters. Rather than characterize these restrictions, we concentrate on
ungendered equilibria with a degenerate distribution of home hours, since the ungendered
equilibrium with non-degenerate distribution is strictly Pareto-dominated by the ungendered
equilibrium with degenerate distribution of home hours.
Proposition 5 identi￿es the set of possible equilibria for the model, either one of which could
occur. However, the prevailing gender role distinction in most societies is one in which men
specialize in market production and women in home production. Gender di⁄erences in labor
market outcomes and the household division of labor have often been ascribed to biological
di⁄erences, in particular, women￿ s ability to bear children. In the next section, we explore this
argument in the context of our model.
2.3.1 Equilibrium with Ex-ante Di⁄erences Across Genders
We maintain the assumption that female and male workers are equally productive in market









where " > 0: A strictly positive sign of " corresponds to women￿ s higher relative productivity
in home work, which we relate to their ability to bear children. The parameter " can be
interpreted as a measure of the decreased relative market productivity of women during and
after pregnancy. Alternatively, if children are viewed as a component of the public home good,
" captures women￿ s greater relative contribution due to their ability to give birth and breast
feed children. Advances in obstetrics and in medical knowledge reducing the physical stress
associated with pregnancy and the introduction of infant formula, can be represented as a
decrease in the value of ":
The following result holds.
Proposition 6 There exists a unique value of "; ￿ ", such that: i) For 0 < " ￿ ￿ "; there are two
equilibria, one of which features hf=hm < 1; with distribution of home hours ￿f (hH) = 0 and
￿m (hL) = 0; and one which features hf=hm > 1; with distribution of home hours ￿f (hH) = 1
and ￿m (hL) = 1; ii) for " > ￿ "; there is one equilibrium with hf=hm > 1 and distribution of
home hours ￿f (hH) = 1 and ￿m (hL) = 1:
The proof is in the Appendix and we illustrate the argument graphically here. The ￿rst




































Figure 2: Solutions to equation (33) for " = 0:2; hm = 0:3;￿ = 0:8; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1;   = 1:








If ￿rms believe that female home hours are smaller than male home hours, maxEwf (h) >
maxEwm (h); where labor contracts solve Problem F1, by Lemma 4. To verify that hf=hm < 1
is optimal for the household, we need to analyze the solutions to equation (33), which is
represented in ￿gure 2. The lower dashed line corresponds to the right hand side of (33) for
" = 0; while the higher dashed line corresponds to the right hand side of (33) for " > 0:
The properties of labor contracts imply that for " > 0 there are two zeros of (33), both with
with hf=hm < 1: However, by maxEwf (h) > maxEwm (h) and since Ew(h) is decreasing
and convex in h by Proposition 1, the lowest value of hf=hm that solves (33) is optimal for
Problem H1. The optimal value of hm can be derived from (34) as a function of H; which is
pinned down by the rest of the household problem. The resulting distribution of home hours
is ￿f (hH) = 0 and ￿m (hL) = 1; consistent with ￿rms￿beliefs. Clearly, for " high enough,
equation (33) does not have a solution and this equilibrium fails to exist.
If ￿rms believe female home hours are greater than male home hours, maxEwf (h) <
maxEwm (h): To study whether hm=hf < 1 is optimal for Problem H1 in this case, it is useful





















Figure 3: Solutions to equation (35) for hf = 0:3; " = 0:2; ￿ = 0:8; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1;   = 1:












m (hm)](1 + ")
; (35)
and solve for hm=hf: This equation is represented in ￿gure 3. The higher dashed line corre-
sponds to the right hand side of this equation for " = 0; while the lower one corresponds to
strictly positive value of ": Generically, there are two values of hm=hf that solve equation (35)
for " > 0; one strictly smaller and the other strictly greater than 1: However, hm=hf > 1 is not
optimal for Problem H1 under maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h): Hence, the unique solution to
Problem H1 features hm=hf < 1: The optimal value of hf can be derived from equation (35)
for given H: Solving the complete household problem determines the equilibrium distribution
of home hours, which satis￿es ￿f (hH) = 1 and ￿m (hL) = 1; consistent with ￿rm beliefs. The
existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed for any strictly positive value of ":
Proposition 6 has several interesting implications. No ungendered equilibria are possible
when there are ex ante di⁄erences across genders. Interpreting " as a small perturbation to
relative productivities across genders, this result implies that the ungendered equilibrium with
a degenerate distribution of home hours, described in Proposition 5, is unstable. On the other
18hand, there always exists an equilibrium in which wives devote more time to home production.
In this equilibrium, hf=hm is increasing in ": Surprisingly, if relative productivity di⁄erences
are small enough, an additional equilibrium exists in which wives￿home hours are lower than
husbands￿ . The region of multiple equilibria can be characterized by a threshold value of "; ￿ ":
The intuition for the existence of this additional equilibrium is that women￿ s higher relative
home productivity reduces the extent to which they need to contribute to the production of the
home public good. Such an equilibrium is more likely to exist, that is ￿ " is higher, if the degree
of complementarity in spouses￿home hours in home production is high, which corresponds
to low values of the parameter ￿ in the aggregator H (hf;hm). Small values of ￿ increase the
curvature of the left hand side of equation (33), thus raising the value of ￿ ". The threshold ￿ " also
depends on the utility cost of market work  : Speci￿cally, higher values of   raise the intercept
of the right hand side of equations (33) and (35), thus reducing the equilibrium value of ￿ ".
Hence, technological changes that reduce the complementarity between spouses￿hours in the
production of the public home good would actually reduce the region in which the equilibrium
with lower home hours can occur for given ". By contrast, a lower value of the utility cost of
work would expand this region.
This result provides a potential explanation for the prevailing pattern of gender special-
ization and for the persistence of gender wage di⁄erentials. Initially, high values of " due to
poor medical knowledge and obstetric practices and the lack of alternatives to breast feeding
imply that the only possible equilibrium is one in which women are mostly devoted to home
production and men specialize in market work. Subsequent improvements in medical technolo-
gies related to motherhood reduce the value of "; thus making ungendered equilibria possible.
However, the self-ful￿lling nature of equilibria for low ", coupled with the gendered initial
conditions, implies that the ungendered equilibrium may not prevail, despite the declining
di⁄erences in relative productivities. We explore theses issues in Albanesi and Olivetti (2006).
2.4 The Feedback Between Home Hours and Labor Market Outcomes
To explore in more detail the relation between home hours and earnings predicted by our
model, we now conduct several partial equilibrium comparative statics exercises. Since our
equilibrium analysis concentrates on equilibria with degenerate distribution of home hours, we
restrict attention to labor contracts under moral hazard only that satisfy Proposition 1.
We ￿rst study the role of the parameter ￿; which corresponds to the standard deviation
of output for given e⁄ort. An increase in this parameter makes it harder to infer e⁄ort from
observed output and exacerbates the incentive problem. Equation (11) makes clear that e⁄ort
is decreasing in the value of this parameter, and that this e⁄ect is greater for higher levels
of home hours. Given that higher ￿ reduces the optimal level of e⁄ort to be implemented,
the fraction of incentive pay will also be declining in ￿: By equation (12), this e⁄ect will be
stronger at higher home hours, since the marginal cost of e⁄ort for the worker is increasing in
home hours.
Taken together, these properties of labor contracts imply that if women￿ s home hours are
higher than men￿ s, the female/male earnings ratio will be declining in ￿, while the male-female




























Figure 4: Properties of optimal labor contracts for hf = 0:3 and hm = 0:1:
di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay will be increasing in ￿: This property is illustrated in
￿gure 4 for a numerical example. The female/male earnings ratio corresponds to the red line
(left axis) and the di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay between male and female workers
corresponds to the black line (right axis). ￿ ranges between 0 and 70% of worker potential
output. Home hours are set to hf = 0:3 and hm = 0:1; which corresponds to the average ratio
of wives to husbands home hours observed in the PSID for the 1990￿ s.7
For ￿ = 0; e⁄ort is equal to output, there is no moral hazard, and the fraction of incentive
pay is zero for both female and male workers. However, since women have higher home hours,
￿rms will o⁄er them a labor contract in which they exert lower e⁄ort. Hence, earnings will
be lower for female workers. In this example, the earnings ratio is 75%: Positive values of ￿
exacerbate gender di⁄erentials in earnings for given di⁄erences in home hours. As ￿ increases,
the earnings ratio drops quite rapidly, while the male-female fraction of incentive pay increases.
For ￿ equal to 50%; the earnings ratio is equal to 60%; while male workers￿fraction of incentive
pay is 8 percentage points greater than for female workers.
In ￿gure 5, we reproduce this graph for smaller di⁄erences in home hours across genders,
speci￿cally hf = 0:15 and hm = 0:10: The resulting ratio of female to male home hours in
this example corresponds to the average female/male ratio of home hours for never married
7Other parameter values are   = 0:1 and ￿ = 1:


























Figure 5: Properties of optimal labor contracts for hf = 0:15 and hm = 0:1:
workers in the PSID. The pattern of variation in relation to ￿ is analogous to that in ￿gure
4. However, the earnings ratio is signi￿cantly higher, equal to 93% for ￿ = 0 and dropping
to 89% for ￿ = 50%: The di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay across male and female
workers only reaches 2% for ￿ = 50%.
These ￿ndings translate into the following predictions:
1. The female/male earnings ratio should be lower when the incentive problem is more
severe and the di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay across male and female workers
should be negatively related to the female/male earnings ratio.
2. These e⁄ects are stronger when the di⁄erences in home hours between women and men
is greater.
The dependence of labor market outcomes on home hours delivers additional predictions
concerning the relation between earnings ratios, incentive pay and home hours across spouses.
Speci￿cally:
3. The wife/husband ratio of home hours should display a negative correlation with the
wife/husband earnings ratio.
4. The wife/husband ratio of home hours should display a positive correlation with the
husband/wife di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay.































Figure 6: Properties of optimal labor contracts for ￿ = 0:31:
Prediction 3 is a direct implication of Problem H1, the households￿optimal choice of home
hours across spouses. This property is common to other e¢ cient models of intra-household
allocation. Prediction 4 stems from the speci￿c feedback mechanism between home hours and
the incentive problem in the labor market that we highlight in our model.
We illustrate these predictions in ￿gure 6. The red line corresponds to the wife/husband
earnings ratio (left axis) and the black line to the husband/wife di⁄erence in the fraction of
incentive pay (right axis). They are plotted against hf=hm for ￿ = 0:31: Clearly, the earnings
ratio is smaller than 1 only if the wife￿ s home hours are greater than the husband￿ s. Moreover,
this ratio is decreasing in the di⁄erence in home hours across spouses, while the opposite is
true for the fraction of incentive pay. For hf=hm = 3; the wife/husband earnings ratio is equal
to 70% in this example, while men￿ s fraction of incentive pay is 5 percentage points greater
than women￿ s.
3 Connecting the Model with the Evidence
Our environment features a representative household and a representative ￿rm, so we do not
generate predictions on sorting by gender across industries and occupations. Yet, we can
interpret contracts specifying di⁄erent levels of e⁄ort as corresponding to di⁄erent jobs or
positions within a ￿rm. In our model of the labor market, the severity of the incentive problem
22is related to the variance of observable measures of performance conditional on worker￿ s e⁄ort,
which correspond, respectively, to the parameter ￿ and output, y8. We posit that this varies
across occupations and interpret the comparative statics results in Section 2.4 as predictions
on gender di⁄erentials in earnings and the structure of compensation across occupations. This
constitutes the basis for the link between the theoretical and the empirical analysis in our
paper.
The parameter ￿ cannot be measured directly, while relevant measure of observable perfor-
mance, corresponding to output y in our model may vary across occupations. Intuitively, the
uncertainty associated with a worker￿ s e⁄ort given observable performance measures should
be related to the complexity of the job. This should be higher for management occupations
relative to production occupations, since for managers pro￿ts or revenues are typically used to
measure performance and these depend on a variety of factors, many of which are outside the
control of the manager. For sales occupations, sales volumes are typically used as a measure of
performance. Yet, these depend to a large degree on variables that are not directly related to a
sales personnel￿ s e⁄ort and may be uncertain.9 These considerations are less important for pro-
duction workers. This ranking is consistent with evidence on job characteristics by occupation
reported in MacLeod and Parent (2003). Based on the Quality of Employment Survey and the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, they ￿nd that management and sales occupations are
characterized by greater workers￿autonomy and larger variety of tasks. These characteristics
exacerbate incentive problems in those occupations. They also ￿nd that in those occupations,
incentive pay is used more than in others. This is also consistent with a more severe incentive
problem under moral hazard. Based on this evidence we consider three broad occupational cat-
egories: management, sales and production. We study gender di⁄erentials in earnings and the
structure of compensation across these three occupational categories, motivated by prediction
1 in Section 2.4.10.
To explore the evidence on the link between gender di⁄erences in home hours, earnings
and incentive pay, we exploit the smaller gender di⁄erences in home hours for never married
than for married individuals. This fact is well known and based on prediction 2 in Section 2.4
would imply that gender di⁄erentials in earnings and incentive pay should be smaller for never
marrieds within occupations and the variation by marital status of these di⁄erences should be
greatest in those occupations where the incentive problem is more severe, other things equal.
To summarize, the empirical counterparts of predictions 1 and 2 are:
1. Gender earning di⁄erentials should be higher in occupations in which the incentive prob-
lem is more severe. Di⁄erences in incentive pay between male and female workers should
be inversely related to the gender di⁄erential in earnings.
2. These e⁄ects should be stronger for married than for never married workers.
8See sections 2.1 and 2.4.
9For example, sales workers are typically assigned to speci￿c territories or products. Hence, sales volumes will
￿ uctuate with shocks to local demand. See Catalyst (1995) for a description of the sales occupation, especially
in relation to gender.
10In this exercise, we are implicitly assuming that unobserved di⁄erences in ￿ across occupations are uncor-
related with other unobserved factors a⁄ecting the endogenous variables of interest.
23We draw on two data sources to support these predictions. We use data from the one-
percent Integrated Public Use Microsample (IPUMS) of the decennial Census for the year
2000 to study aggregate gender earnings di⁄erentials by marital status across industries and
occupations. Since the Census does not include information on the structure of earnings, we
use PSID data from the late 1990s to document the negative relation between the male/female
di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay and the female/male earnings ratio.
Finally, we consider a cross-section of married couples from the PSID, in order to support
the model predictions 3. and 4.
3.1 Evidence from the Census
Our Census sample includes all white individuals between 25 and 54 years of age, who are not
in school, do not reside on a farm or live in group quarters. We also exclude the armed forces
and restrict attention to those individuals who worked at least 50 weeks in the previous year
and who usually work at least 30 hours per week. We consider three occupational categories:
sales, management and production in 16 industries. We analyze separately married and never
married workers.11
In order to make a meaningful comparison of gender earnings di⁄erentials, we need to take
into account systematic di⁄erences in observable characteristics such as age and education
by marital status and across occupations/industries. For example, never married individuals
tend, on average, to be younger than married individuals. Since gender gaps in earnings
increase by age this could bias the comparison in our favor. In order to control for these
systematic di⁄erences we compute the gender gap in earnings for married and never married
workers by running median regressions that control for a gender dummy, as well as for human
capital variables - age and its square term and three education dummies.12 We estimate this
measure of residual gender earnings di⁄erentials separately for each industry and for each of
the three broad occupational categories. Thus, we are e⁄ectively controlling for systematic
di⁄erences by gender, age, education and marital status in the distribution of workers across
occupations/industries.
The dependent variable in the regressions for each industry/occupation cell is the log of
annual earnings. In our analysis we use total labor earnings because this is the data counterpart
of the measure of total labor compensation in our model. However, one could argue that this
is not the appropriate measure of labor compensation when making gender comparisons, since
women tend to work fewer hours than men on the labor market. This concern is attenuated
by the fact that we only consider individuals that usually work at least 30 hours per week and
who were employed for at least 50 weeks in the previous year. While this sample selection
criterion considerably reduces the variation in the number of market hours within and between
gender groups, we also conducted our analysis using the log of hourly earnings as a dependent
11See the Data Appendix, Table A1, for variable de￿nitions and for summary statistics for our sample.
12The three dummies correspond to the following categories: high school completed, some college and college
completed. The omitted dummy variable corresponds to individuals who completed less than twelve years of
schooling.
24variable. Our ￿ndings in this case, reported in the Data Appendix, Table A2, are consistent
with those for annual earnings reported in this section.13
Table 1 reports the residual female/male ratio of median earnings for full-time year-round
workers for the three occupational categories by industry and by marital status.14 The ￿rst
column refers to management occupations, the second to sales occupations and the third to
production occupations. In each column, we report the statistics separately for married workers
and for never married workers. The ￿rst row of the table, displays the average female/male
ratio of median earnings across all industries for each occupational category.
We ￿nd a considerable variation in the female/male earnings ratio across industries, and
across the three occupational categories within each industry, even after controlling for gender
di⁄erence in human capital characteristics. Moreover, the patterns of variation di⁄er substan-
tially by marital status. We can summarize our ￿ndings as follows:
1. There is a large variation in residual female/male median earnings ratios across industries
conditional on marital status, yet in all industries and occupations the female/male
earnings ratio is lower for married than for never married workers.
2. For married workers, the female/male earnings ratio is lowest in management and sales
occupations. The median married woman in sales earns, just 69 percent of what the
median married man earns on average across all industries, while in management occu-
pations she earns 72 percent of the median married man￿ s total earnings. The highest
value of the gender earnings ratio for married workers is in production occupations, where
the median woman earns 80 percent of median male earnings.
3. For never married workers, the ranking of earnings ratios across occupations is reversed
and gender di⁄erentials are smallest for management and sales, and highest in production.
The median single woman earns 92 percent in sales and 94 percent in management of the
total labor compensation earned by the median man in the corresponding occupation.
Production occupations display the lowest ratio, equal to 83 percent.
As a result, the di⁄erence in gender earnings ratio of married relative to never married
workers is substantial in sales and management occupations, approximately 20 percentage
points. By contrast, gender earnings ratios do not vary signi￿cantly by marital status for
production workers. These patterns suggest that across all industries married women are
subject to the largest earnings penalty in those occupations where the incentive problem is
most severe and that gender earnings di⁄erentials are positively related to gender di⁄erentials
13We also performed the analysis for the sample of workers with children. The pattern of ranking of the
gender earnings ratios by marital status across occupational categories and industries is identical to the one
reported in the paper for the overall sample. These results are reported in the Data Appendix, Table A3.
We have also experimented with di⁄erent sample inclusion rules by considering all racial groups and by
expanding the sample to include all individuals aged 16 to 64. In all the cases the results of our analysis are
quantitatively similar to the ones reported in the paper.
14Entries in the table are in percentage points. They are obtained by taking the exponential of the estimated
regression coe¢ cient for the female dummy expressed in log points.
25in home hours. These ￿ndings are consistent with predictions 1 and 2 of our model. In the
next section, we use PSID data to further our analysis.
Table 1: Female/male median earnings ratios across industries, occupations, and marital
status
(Full-time, year-round workers, entries in %)
Management Sales Production
married single married single married single
Average across all industries 72 94 69 92 80 83
Accommodation and Food 71 95 55 99 80 84
Administrative, Support, Waste mgmt 76 90 68 86 81 85
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation 77 104 78 87 83 87
Construction 67 75 75 77 83 87
Educational Services 81 93 82 95 83 87
Finance and Insurance 65 88 64 87 83 87
Health Care & Social Assistance 70 91 57 70 77 80
Information 73 91 83 102 82 86
Manufacturing 76 90 71 93 66 67
Other Services (no Public Adm.) 72 101 64 78 76 79
Profess,Scienti￿c&Tech. Services 72 90 70 90 83 86
Public Administration 80 103 81 129 83 87
Real Estate and Rental/Leasing 66 103 64 113 83 87
Retail Trade 65 101 56 83 72 74
Transportation and Warehousing 71 94 64 85 83 87
Wholesale Trade 70 101 75 92 79 83
3.2 Evidence from the PSID
We document the negative relation between male/female di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive
pay and the female/male earnings ratio across occupations predicted by our model using PSID
data for the late 1990s. As we did with the Census data, we select our sample to include all
white men and women between 25 and 54 years of age who are not in school, who are not
in the armed forces, and who worked at least 30 hours per week and 50 weeks per year. As
in the previous section, gender earnings ratios correspond to the estimated coe¢ cients for a
female dummy in log-earnings regressions that also control for age and its square term and
three education dummies.
We concentrate on gender earnings ratios at the occupation/industry level. The PSID
coding of occupations di⁄ers from the one available from the Census 2000, but we construct
occupational categories that are similar to the ones used for our Census analysis. This level of
26disaggregation requires a larger sample size than the one available in each wave of the PSID.
Hence, we do not exploit the panel dimension of the data but simply pool together all the
individuals in the 1994 to 2001 waves. The resulting statistics can be interpreted as medium
run averages of the relevant variables.15 Our measure of the fraction of incentive pay is the
ratio of bonuses and commissions to labor income, de￿ned as wages and salaries, plus bonuses
and commissions. Since the PSID only reports information on bonuses and commissions for
household heads, that are predominantly married males or single women, we cannot condition
on marital status.16 Summary statistics for this sample are reported in the Data Appendix,
Table A4.
We ￿nd a strong negative correlation between the female/male earnings ratio and the
male/female di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay. The correlation coe¢ cient is ￿0:65 and
it is signi￿cant at the one percent level. This correlation (as well as all the subsequent ones
we report) takes into account the relative weight of each occupation in aggregate employment.
Figure 7 displays a scatter plot of these two variables. Consistent with our Census ￿ndings, sales
and management occupations in banking, ￿nance and in the clerical sector are characterized
by the lowest female/male earnings ratio and the highest male/female di⁄erence in the fraction
of incentive pay.17
We also use the PSID data on bonuses and commissions to corroborate our ￿ndings on
the severity of the incentive problem and gender earnings di⁄erentials discussed in section 3.1.
Figure 8 reports a scatter plot of the aggregate fraction of incentive pay, which we interpret as
a proxy for the general strength of incentives in an occupation, and the female/male earnings
ratio across occupations. The correlation between these two variables is ￿0:57; signi￿cant at
the ￿ve percent level. Consistent with MacLeod and Parent (2003), the occupations with job
characteristics that imply a more severe incentive problem exhibit a higher fraction of incentive
pay. These same occupations also have low female/male earnings ratios. The fraction of
incentive pay varies between 0 (for Teachers) and 3:2% (for Sales). These incentive pay shares
are averages over the entire sample. If we restrict attention to those respondents that report
positive bonuses or commissions, which comprise approximately 10% of the sample,18 the
fraction of incentive pay varies from 1:7% for laborers to 23% for sales, as reported in ￿gure
9. The correlation between the fraction of incentive pay and the female/male earnings ratio in
this case is ￿0:65; signi￿cant at the one percent level.
15In the PSID, data on hours worked, total labor earnings, bonuses and commision income, are reported
for the previous calendar year. Hence, our data covers the time period 1993-2000. In 1997 the PSID started
collecting information bi-annually. Hence, our sample includes 6 waves of PSID data.
16Information on bonuses and commission is only available for 27% women in the sample. Of these, only 13
are married. Information on incentive pay is available for 99% of the men in the sample, of which 80% are
married.
17To account for the role of di⁄erences in hours worked in determining gender earnings di⁄erentials, we also
conduct this analysis for hourly wages. We ￿nd that the correlation between the female/male di⁄erence in log
hourly wages and the male/female di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay is -0.54 and signi￿cant at the ￿ve
percent level.
18MacLeod and Parent (2003) ￿nd that the percentage of workers reporting positive incentive pay is 17% in
the 1993 wave of the PSID and 20% in the NLSY. For the PSID, this discrepancy may be due to the fact that
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Figure 9: Correlation between the F/M earnings ratio and the aggregate fraction of incentive
pay for workers with positive incentive pay.
30Since our female sample is disproportionately composed of single women, the average female
shares of incentive pay by occupation are likely to provide an upper bound on the actual
statistics for the entire female population. As a consequence, the male-female di⁄erences in
incentive pay shares we report may underestimate the actual di⁄erence observed in the data,
especially so for sales and management occupations, where the incentive problem is most severe.
The analysis above highlights gender di⁄erences in incentive pay shares across occupations.
Although this statistic is informative it does not provide a correct measure of the role of incen-
tive pay in explaining gender di⁄erentials because it does not take into account of di⁄erences in
the levels of total compensation across genders/occupations. For instance, if the male-female
di⁄erence in total compensation is larger in occupations where the incentive problem is most
severe and these occupations are also characterized by the highest levels of total compensation,
then a small percentage points di⁄erence in incentive pay share across genders will translate
into a relatively larger gender di⁄erence in total compensation.
In order to quantitatively assess the role of incentive pay in explaining gender di⁄erentials,
we estimate the fraction of male-female di⁄erences in total compensation that can be attributed
to male-female di⁄erences in performance-based pay. Suppose that ij is the monetary value of
incentive pay and wj is total earnings for a worker of sex j = f;m, then the average value of
im￿if
wm￿wf , by occupation and overall, represents the fraction of the gender di⁄erential in earnings
explained by gender di⁄erences in incentive pay. We compute this statistic both for the entire
sample and for just those workers who report positive incentive pay.
The results are reported in Table 2. The ￿rst two columns of the table report the fraction
of the gender earnings di⁄erential that can be attributed to di⁄erences in incentive pay re-
spectively for the overall sample and for the sample that excludes workers who did not report
any incentive pay. The last two columns of the table display the fraction of workers reporting
positive incentive pay. We report the statistics for the four broad occupation/industry cate-
gories characterized by the largest incidence of incentive pay and for all the occupations. If we
average over the entire sample, we ￿nd that for management, banking and ￿nance the gender
di⁄erences in incentive pay account for respectively 10% and 21% of the di⁄erences in total
earnings. For lower management and sales, they account for 6%. If we restrict our sample
to those workers who report positive incentive pay, for management, banking and ￿nance the
fraction increases to 24 and 31%, respectively. For lower management and sales, it reaches
22 and 28%, respectively. Note moreover, that the fraction of females and males that report
incentive pay is very similar for each occupation, which indicates there is no gender bias in
reporting incentive pay. This analysis suggests that di⁄erences in incentive pay are quite im-
portant in accounting for di⁄erences in earnings in those occupations where incentives play a
role. These results con￿rm our Census analysis.
31Table 2: Share of gender earnings di⁄erential explained by gender di⁄erences in incentive pay
(entries in %)
Overall Sample Sample with incentive pay % with positive incentive pay
Males Females
Management 10 24 19 24
Mngmnt, Banking, Finance 21 31 26 20
Lower Management 6 22 13 14
Sales 6 28 17 14
Overall* 5 24 11 14
Based on PSID data for 1994 to 2001. See text for sample selection rules. *Overall refers to the weighted
average of each statistics across all occupations.
Interestingly, the large variation in the female/male earnings ratio across the occupations
considered is not systematically related to the fraction of females working in a given occupa-
tion. As shown in Figure 10, there is no clear relation between these two variables and their
correlation is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.19 This evidence casts doubts on explana-
tions of gender earnings di⁄erentials based solely on occupational sorting by gender. Although
it would be interesting to study the di⁄erential role of occupational sorting and incentive
problems within each occupation in accounting for gender earnings di⁄erentials, this analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this paper since our representative household/representative ￿rm
environment does not generate predictions on occupational sorting.
Finally, we tackle predictions 3 and 4 in Section 2.4, which are based on the assumption
that households make e¢ cient decisions on the allocation of home hours. This assumption
implies that the spouse with higher earnings will contribute fewer hours to the production
of the home public good and, given the structure of the optimal labor contracts, will receive
a higher fraction of incentive pay. In a cross-section of married couples, these predictions
translate into:
3. The correlation between the wife/husband ratio of home hours and the wife/husband
ratio of earnings should be negative.
4. The correlation between the wife/husband ratio of home hours and the husband-wife
di⁄erence in the fraction of incentive pay should be positive.
We study these correlations across a sample of married couples using the PSID. The ideal
data set for this exercise would include information on home hours, market hours, labor earn-
ings and the structure of compensation for both spouses for an ample cross-section of married
couples. While being far from ideal, the PSID is one of the few data sets that allows us to
move in this direction. In particular, we have information on home hours, market hours and
19The same is true for the di⁄erence in log hourly wages and for the Census 2000 sample. This is also consistent
with evidence from the National Committee on Pay Equity, based on the 2000 Household Data Annual Averages















































Corr. Coeff. = -.001 (.99)
Figure 10: Correlation between the percentage of female workers and the F/M earnings ratio.
33earnings of both spouses.20 However, we only have information on bonuses and commissions
for household heads. In order to recover the information for spouses, we use the available
information on occupation jointly with the gender-speci￿c average shares of incentive pay by
occupational categories. We impute a value of ~ w that is equal to the fraction of incentive pay
received by the average worker of the same gender in the same occupation. We then compute
~ wm ￿ ~ wf for each couple as the di⁄erence of the reported incentive pay shares of husband and
of the imputed incentive pay share of the wife.
To minimize the impact of additional factors, such as race, cohort and wife￿ s labor market
attachment, that could be driving the cross-sectional correlations we are interested in exploring,
we aim to build a sample that is homogeneous with respect to age, presence of young children
in the household, and labor market attachment of both spouses, while maintaining a reasonable
sample size. We include male-headed married couples where both husband and wife are white,
the head of the household is between 25 and 44 years old and both spouses are full-time year-
round workers (they both work at least 30 hours per week and at least 50 weeks per year).
Moreover, we only consider couples that report all the relevant variables for both partners.
Summary statistics for this sample are presented in Data Appendix, Table A5. We report the
results of our analysis in Table 3.
Table 3



















Number of couples 300 167
p-values in parentheses.
Entries in column 1 refer to the sample of married couples. Column 2 reports correlation
coe¢ cients for the sample of married couples with children less than 13 years old. Our sam-
20The variable that reports home hours in the PSID poses a measurement problem. The survey respondent is
asked to provide a measure of weekly hours worked at home by him- or herself and by the spouse (if married.)
No time diaries are used. This could be problematic if respondents tend to overestimate their own home hours
and to underestimate their spouses￿home hours. In particular, if respondents are disproportionately women
we would tend to overestimate the wife/husband ratio of home hours. Evidence from time-use surveys for the
late-1990s (Freeman (2000)) con￿rms the PSID evidence that wives spend, on average, at least twice as much
time than their husbands in home production activities irrespective of their labor market status.
The ￿rst wave of the American Time-Use data set (ATUS), made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
in January 2005, could provide an alternative to the PSID. The ATUS data, however, also has a serious drawback
for married households. Only one spouse is selected at random and asked to ￿ll the time-use questionnaire.
Consequently, time-use information is not available for both husbands and wives for the CPS sample. This
makes it impossible to analyze patterns of relative home hours and earnings across married couples.
34ple consists of 300 couples of which 167 have children. The data con￿rms prediction 3 that
wife/husband earnings and home hours ratios are negatively correlated across all households.
This is true irrespective of the presence of children. The correlation coe¢ cient is -0.27 and sig-
ni￿cant at the one percent level in both samples. On the other hand, the validity of prediction
4 depends on the presence of children. We ￿nd that for the overall sample there is a positive
but small and not signi￿cant correlation between the di⁄erence in incentive pay shares across
spouses and the wife/husband ratio of home hours, whereas for the sample of married couples
with children, the correlation coe¢ cient is equal to 0.21 and it is signi￿cant at the one percent
level.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper lays out a simple framework that endogenizes gender di⁄erentials in earnings and
home hours. Incentive problems in the labor market play an essential role in our model. One
limitation of our analysis stems from the assumption that all agents are ex ante identical except
for gender and production is carried out by a representative ￿rm. This implies that we cannot
address selection of women and men into di⁄erent occupations or industries. Moreover, there
are no e¢ ciency losses associated with gender discrimination. An extension of the model that
allows for a non-degenerate distribution of individual productivities, symmetric across genders,
could address in part both these issues. In a gendered equilibrium, female workers with high
productivity may be induced to sort into low skill occupations and be o⁄ered contracts in
which they exert ine¢ ciently low e⁄ort. This would generate misallocation costs associated
with gender discrimination.
The empirical analysis based on Census and PSID data provides suggestive evidence in
support of the mechanism giving rise to gender earnings di⁄erentials we explore in our model.
However, these data sets cannot be used to directly test our model￿ s predictions. Speci￿cally,
the Census does not report home hours or the fraction of incentive pay. This information is
available in the PSID, which does not report incentive of pay for both husbands and wives. The
ideal data set would include observations on the structure of earnings at the individual level
for a broad class of sectors and jobs, as well as detailed household level information. To the
best of our knowledge, such a data set is not available for the U.S. While a structural empirical
analysis of our model is beyond the scope of this paper, it constitutes an interesting avenue of
future research.
In this paper, we focus on gender earnings di⁄erentials and abstract from labor force par-
ticipation decisions. A recent literature has emphasized the e⁄ect of technological change on
female labor force participation. Galor and Weil (1996) develop a model in which skill bias
technological change contributes to a transformation of women￿ s role in market production over
the course of the twentieth century by in￿ uencing their fertility and participation decisions.
Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) explore the e⁄ect of exogenous changes in gender wage
di⁄erentials on the labor force participation of married women between 1950 and 1990. Green-
wood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) focus on the role of new home durables introduced in
35the twentieth century and argue that they acted as "engines of liberation" for women￿ s time.21
Olivetti (2006) quanti￿es the role of rising returns to labor market experience on women￿ s
lifetime labor supply. Bailey (2006) estimates the impact of the introduction of oral contra-
ceptives on women￿ s employment and wages. This body of work treats both gender earning
di⁄erentials and the household division of labor as exogenous. Albanesi and Olivetti (2006)
document improvements in obstetric practices and the development of breast milk substitutes
that reduced the time cost associated with women￿ s maternal role and study the e⁄ect of these
developments on the division of labor within the household, married women￿ s labor force par-
ticipation and gender earnings di⁄erentials. Our framework can be extended to think about
how these di⁄erent sources of technological progress may in￿ uence gender wage di⁄erentials
and female labor force participation.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Labor Contracts
Proof of Proposition 1. The ￿rst order necessary conditions for Problem 1 at an interior
solution are:
f0 (e) ￿ ve (h;e) + ￿
￿
~ wf00 (e) ￿ vee (h;e)
￿
= 0; (36)
￿￿￿2 ~ w + ￿f0 (e) = 0: (37)
To solve for e⁄ort, substitute ￿ = ￿￿2 ~ w
f0(e) and ~ w =
ve(h;e)
f0(e) ; into (36) to obtain an equation in e :







f00 (e) ￿ vee (h;e)
￿
= 0: (38)
Assuming (9)-(10), (38) simpli￿es to:
1 ￿ (  + h)e ￿ ￿￿2 (  + h)
2 e = 0;
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f0 (^ ei) ~ wi ￿ ve (hj; ^ ei)
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;
The ￿rst order necessary conditions for problem 2; substituting in the speci￿c function forms
for f and v, are:
0:5(1 ￿ (  + hj)ej) + ￿j (  + hj) ￿ ￿j (￿ ~ wj + (  + hj)ej) = 0; (40)
￿0:5￿￿2 ~ wj ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿j
￿




^ ej ￿ ￿￿2 ~ wj
￿
= 0; (41)
￿￿j ( ~ wi ￿ (  + hj) ^ ei) + ￿j (  + hj) = 0; (42)
￿0:5 + ￿j ￿ ￿i ￿ 0; with equality for Tj > 0; (43)
~ wj ￿ (  + hj)ej = 0; (44)
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= 0; ￿j ￿ 0; (46)
~ wi ￿ (  + hj) ^ ei = 0; (47)
for j = L;H and i 6= j: By (^ ei); ￿j = 0 for L;H: Only one adverse selection incentive com-
patibility constraint can bind at any given time. There are three possible cases. A) ￿L > 0;
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(  + hH)
￿
; (ej)
and (16)-(18). To verify that this is a solution, we check that TL is indeed strictly positive.
Substituting:
~ wH ￿ ~ wL =
(  + hL)
(2  + hH + hL)
￿
1
(  + hL)2￿￿2
=
2￿￿2 (  + hL) ￿
( +hH)
( +hL) ￿ 1
(2  + hH + hL)2￿￿2 > 0:
Hence, if 1 < ￿￿2 (  + hL) <
￿
( +hH)
( +hL) + 1
￿
0:5; TL is positive.
39B) TH > 0; ￿H > 0 and TL = ￿L = 0: Solving equations (40)-(47) yields:
0:5
( ~ wL ￿ 1)
(  + hL)
= ￿L; 0:5
( ~ wH ￿ 1)
(  + hH)
= ￿H; (ej)
and (19)-(21). Since:
~ wL ￿ ~ wH =
  + hH
2  + hH + hL
￿
1
2￿￿2 (  + hH)
=
2￿￿2 (  + hH) ￿
2 +hH+hL
( +hH)
(2  + hH + hL)2￿￿2 > 0;
if and only if 1 > ￿￿2 (  + hH) > 0:5
2 +hH+hL
( +hH) ; then TH > 0:
C) ￿L = ￿H = 0 and TL = TH = 0: When the adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding, the solution to the ￿rst order conditions is:
0:5
(1 ￿ (  + hj)ej)
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  + hj + (  + hj)
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for j = H;L: This delivers (22). To verify that the adverse selection incentive compatibility






















Since ~ wL > ~ wH; the two inequalities are satis￿ed for 1
( +hH) ￿￿￿2 ￿ 0 and 1
( +hL) ￿￿￿2 ￿ 0.
5.2 Household Problem
Let MCH (C) = @CH (H;C)=@H be the marginal cost of H; which is independent of H given














The second cost minimization problem for the household can be written as:




k + MCH (C)H (Problem H2)
subject to
H￿k1￿￿ ￿ ￿ G;



















These equations de￿ne k and H as a function of G: We can then de￿ne MCG (C) = @CG (G;C)=@G;
with:







Problems H1 and H2 are convex minimization problems. Hence, ￿rst order necessary
conditions are su¢ cient and the optima will be attained by the respective policy functions.
Combining the solutions to problem H1 and H2, we can de￿ne the functions ^ hf (G;C); ^ hm (G;C)
that express the optimal intra-household allocation of home hours as a function of the level
of public home consumption: The last step of the household problem is to optimize (??) by
choice of G; sf and sm subject to sf +sm +MCG (C)G ￿ a; since we consider equilibria with
￿ = 0: The solution to this problem gives rise to the policy functions: si (a;C); and G(a;C);
and recursively to hi (a;C) = ^ hm (G(a;C);C) for i = f;m:
5.3 Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 4
To prove the ￿rst result, note that given that there is a representative household, in a
gendered equilibrium, home hours will be constant across wives and husbands, leading to two
values of home hours in the population with 0 < hL < hH: In an ungendered equilibrium,
households are indi⁄erent over the distribution of home hours across spouses and they ran-
domize. The randomization strategy will be the same across all households leading to at
most two values of home hours in the population. To prove the second result, note that a
non-degenerate distribution of home hours occurs when households are indi⁄erent over the
allocation of home hours across spouses. Suppose that the distribution of home hours is non-
degenerate and the equilibrium is gendered, so that ￿m (hj) 6= ￿f (hj) for j = L;M for some
0 < hL < hH. Then, wives and husbands will not be facing the same menu of labor contracts
and randomization will not be optimal and the distribution of home hours will be degenerate.
Contradiction. Hence, if the distribution of home hours is non-degenerate, the equilibrium is
ungendered. Now, suppose that in an ungendered equilibrium, the households￿randomization
strategy does not assign hH and hL with equal probability to the wife and the husband, so
that Pr(hL = hf) 6= Pr(hL = hm). By the law of conditional expectations, Pr(hL = hi) =
Pr(i)￿i (hL) for i = f;m. Since Pr(i) = 0:5 for i = f;m, Pr(hL = hf) 6= Pr(hL = hm)
implies ￿f (hL) 6= ￿m (hL). Contradiction. Then, in any equilibrium with a non-degenerate
distribution of home hours, ￿f (hL) = ￿m (hL) = 0:5 for j = L;H.￿
Proof of Proposition 5
If ￿rms￿beliefs satisfy Pr(hf < hm) = 1; then maxEwf (h) > maxEwm (h): If such an
equilibrium exists, hf < hm and the distribution of home hours will be given by ￿f (hH) = 0
41and ￿m (hL) = 0; by Lemma 4. Hence, equilibrium labor contracts will satisfy proposition 1.
Such an equilibrium exists, if Problem H1 has a solution with hf=hm < 1: Such an equilibrium














where x = hf=hm: Equation (48) implicitly de￿nes x as a function of hm; while (49) de￿nes
hm as a function of H: The following lemma characterizes the solutions to (48).
Lemma 7 If labor contracts satisfy proposition 1, equation (48) generically has two solutions,
x1 (hm) = 1 and x2 (hm) < 1; with limhm!0 x2 (hm) = 1 and limhm!1 x2 (hm) = 0: Moreover,
equation (49) has a unique ￿nite solution hi




Proof. The left hand side of equation (48) is increasing and concave in x and crosses the
forty-￿ve degree line at x = 0 and x = 1: Given that ￿rms￿ beliefs over the distribution
of home hours in the population are degenerate, the contracts o⁄ered to female and male
workers are described by proposition 1. It follows that
Ew0(hm)
Ew0(hm) = 1; so that one solution to
(48) is x1 (hm) = 1: Since, E0w￿0 (h) < 0 and Ew￿00 (h) > 0; for all 0 < x < 1;
Ew0(hm)
Ew0(xhm) <
1: Moreover, the right hand side of (48) is continuous and increasing in x; since the slope




Ew0(xhm) ; is positive. Since by
(12) and (11), limx!0 Ew0 (xhm) < 0 and Ew0 (hm)=limx!0 Ew0 (xhm) < 1; there must be
another crossing at x2 (hm) < 1: The convexity of Ew0 (h); implies that x2 (hm) is decreasing
in hm: In addition, proposition 1 implies w￿0 (0) is ￿nite and limhm!1 Ew0 (h) = 0. Then,
limhm!0 x2 (hm) = 1 and limhm!1 x2 (hm) = 0 follows. By (49), h1
m (H) = H2￿1=￿. Since
x2 (hm) is decreasing in hm; limhm!0 x2 (hm) = 1 and limhm!1 x2 (hm) = 0; the right hand
side of equation (49) evaluated at x2 (hm) is bounded below 1; and bounded above by 2￿1=￿:
Since limhm!0 H=hm = 1 and limhm!1 H=hm = 0; (48) has a unique ￿nite solution when
evaluated at x2 (hm); h2
m (H) > 0:
By lemma 7, generically there exist two zeros for equation (48), x1 = 1 and x2 2 (0;1).
However, under maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h); x1 = 1 is not optimal for Problem H1. Hence,
the unique solution to problem H1 is 0 < hL = hf = x2hm = x2hH for hm that solves (30) and
H that solves Problem H2. This solution is constant for all households. Hence, the resulting
distribution of home hours is ￿f (hH) = 0 and ￿m (hL) = 0; consistent with ￿rms￿beliefs.
If ￿rms￿beliefs satisfy Pr(hf > hm) = 0; then maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h): If such an
equilibrium exists, hf > hm and the distribution of home hours will be given by ￿f (hH) = 1













where y = hm=hf: Applying lemma 7 to (50)-(51) implies that there are two zeros for (50):
y1 = 1 and y2 (hf) < 1: But under maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h); y1 = 1 is not optimal for
Problem H1. Hence, the unique solution to Problem H1 is 0 < hL = hm = y2hf = y2hH
for all households; resulting in the distribution of home hours ￿m (hH) = 0 and ￿f (hL) = 0;
consistent with ￿rms￿beliefs. This proves result i) in proposition 5. Note that y2 (h) = x2 (h)
and h2
m (H) = h2
f (H):
If ￿rms￿beliefs satisfy Pr(hf = hm) = 1; then Ewf (h) = Ewm (h) for all possible values
of h: By Lemma 7, x1 = 1 is a zero for equation (48). Moreover, under Ewf (h) = Ewm (h);




i = f;m with ￿ h = H2￿1=￿, by (49), consistent with ￿rms￿beliefs. By contrast the zero x2 < 1
for equation (48) would induce a distribution of home hours inconsistent with ￿rms￿beliefs.
Since there is a unique value of ￿ h which solves Problem H1, this equilibrium is unique. This
proves result ii) in proposition 5.￿
5.4 Ex Ante Di⁄erences
Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that ￿rms believe that female home hours are smaller than male home hours, so
that maxEwf (h) > maxEwm (h): To see if hf=hm < 1 is optimal for the household, we need
















(1 + ")x￿ + 1
i1=￿
; (53)
has a solution with x < 1 when, by Lemma 4, labor contracts solve Problem F1. By Lemma 7,
for " > 0 (52) has two zeros, with 0 < x2 < x1 < 1: By maxEwf (h) > maxEwm (h) and since
Ew(h) is decreasing and convex in h by Proposition 1, x1 will not be optimal for Problem H1.
Hence, households will choose hL = hf = x2hm = hH and the resulting distribution of home
hours will be ￿f (hH) = 0 and ￿m (hL) = 0; consistent with ￿rms￿beliefs. If " is high enough,
however, equation (52) fails to have a solution so that this equilibrium fails to exist.
If ￿rms believe female home hours are greater than male home hours, maxEwf (h) <
maxEwm (h): This outcome can be an equilibrium if hm=hf > 1 solves Problem H1. To verify















(1 + ") + y￿
i1=￿
: (55)
43By Lemma 7, for " > 0; generically, there are two zeros for equation (54), 0 < y1 < 1 < y2:
However, y2 is not optimal for Problem H1 under maxEwf (h) < maxEwm (h): Hence, the
unique solution to Problem H1 is y2 > 1: Then, the equilibrium distribution of home hours





1.  Census Analysis 
The Census sample includes 25-54 year old white men and women, who are not in 
school, not in the armed forces, do not reside on a farm or live in group quarters. We include 
individuals who worked at least 50 weeks in the previous year and who usually work at least 30 
hours per week. 
We use the following Census variables in our analysis. INCWAGE for total annual wages 
and salaries, WKSWORK1 for weeks worked and UHRSWORK for usual hours worked per 
week. These three variables report information for the year preceding the Census survey. For 
educational attainment we use the variable EDUCREC to group individuals according to four 
broad educational categories: less than high school, high school completed, some college and 
college completed. We construct four education dummies based on this categorization. The first 
dummy is equal to one if an individual has completed less than twelve years of schooling and is 
equal to zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is equal to one if he or she has completed 
twelve years of schooling, and is equal to zero otherwise. The third dummy variable equals one if 
the individual has completed between twelve and fifteen years of schooling and it is equal to zero 
otherwise. Finally, the fourth dummy variable is equal to one if an individual has completed at 
least sixteen years of education and it equals zero otherwise. The omitted dummy variable in the 
regressions corresponds to individuals who completed less than twelve years of schooling. For 
industry, we use the variable INDNAICS that reports the type of establishment in which a person 
worked in terms of the good or service produced. Industries are coded according to the North 
American Industrial Classification System developed in 1997. We have excluded from our 
sample workers in Agriculture Forestry Fishing, and Hunting, Mining and Utilities. This is 
because for these three industries we are unable to compute adjusted gender earnings ratios for 
the sample of never married workers in sales and management occupations.  That is, once we 
control for age and education in each of the occupation/industry cells there is not enough 
variation left to estimate the coefficient on the female dummy. We use the variable OCCSOC for 
occupation. OCCSOC classifies occupations according to the 1998 Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) system. The Census also provides an aggregation of all the occupations in 
23 broader categories that include the three categories considered in the analysis. The definition 
of production occupations also includes construction and extraction workers. 
 
Table A1:  Summary Statistics for the Census sample 
      Males     Females 
   mean 
st. 
dev.   mean 
st. 
dev. 
Age   40.03  8.06    40.14  8.19 
Less thanHS  0.07 0.25    0.04 0.20 
HS   0.30  0.46    0.30  0.46 
Some college  0.30 0.46    0.35 0.48 
College+  0.33 0.47    0.30 0.46   46
Married spouse present  0.70 0.46    0.62 0.49 
Married spouse absent  0.01 0.10    0.01 0.09 
Separated  0.02 0.12    0.03 0.16 
Divorced   0.11 0.31    0.17 0.38 
Widowed   0.00  0.06    0.02  0.12 
Never married  0.16 0.37    0.16 0.36 
Number of children  1.09 1.20    0.94 1.08 
Salary (annual)  49552 49929    33240 29358 
Market Hours (annual)  2405 477    2185 387 
Log hourly earnings  2.86 0.65    2.59 0.58 
Management  0.07 0.25    0.05 0.22 
Business and financial operations  0.04 0.21    0.07 0.25 
Computer and math  0.04 0.19    0.02 0.15 
Architecture and engineering  0.04 0.20    0.01 0.09 
Life, physical, and social science  0.01 0.11    0.01 0.10 
Community and social services  0.01 0.10    0.02 0.14 
Legal occupations  0.01 0.12    0.02 0.13 
Education, training and library  0.02 0.13    0.05 0.22 
Arts, design, ent, sports and media  0.02 0.14    0.02 0.14 
Healthcare practitioner and techn.  0.03 0.16    0.09 0.28 
Healthcare support  0.00 0.05    0.03 0.17 
Protective services  0.03 0.18    0.01 0.09 
Food preparation and serving  0.02 0.12    0.03 0.17 
Building, ground cleaning/maintenance  0.03 0.16    0.02 0.13 
Personal care services  0.01 0.08    0.03 0.18 
Sales  0.11 0.32    0.11 0.31 
Office and administrative support  0.06 0.24    0.27 0.45 
Farming, fishing and forestry  0.01 0.08    0.00 0.04 
Construction and extraction  0.10 0.30    0.00 0.06 
Installation, maintenance and repair  0.08 0.27    0.01 0.07 
Production  0.11 0.32    0.06 0.24 
Transportation and material moving  0.08 0.28    0.02 0.13 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting  0.01 0.11    0.00 0.06 
0.01 0.09    0.00 0.04  Mining 
Utilities  0.02 0.13    0.01 0.08 
Construction  0.12 0.32    0.02 0.14 
Manufacturing  0.21 0.41    0.12 0.32 
Wholesale trade  0.06 0.23    0.03 0.17 
Retail Trade  0.10 0.30    0.11 0.32 
Transportation and Warehousing  0.06 0.24    0.03 0.16 
Information  0.03 0.18    0.04 0.19 
Finance and Insurance  0.04 0.20    0.09 0.28 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  0.02 0.13    0.02 0.14   47
Professional, Scientific, and Technical  0.07 0.26    0.07 0.26 
Administrative and Support and Waste Man  0.03 0.16    0.03 0.16 
Educational Services  0.04 0.18    0.08 0.27 
Health care and social assistance  0.04 0.20    0.20 0.40 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation  0.01 0.12    0.01 0.12 
Accomodation and Food Services  0.03 0.16    0.04 0.20 
Other Services (exclude Public Administration)  0.04 0.20    0.04 0.20 
Public Administration  0.06 0.24    0.06 0.23 
            
Number of Observations  31489615    21461034  





Table A2: Gender differences in earnings across industries, occupation, and marital status 
(Full-time, year-round workers, % female/male median hourly earnings ratios) 
 
   Management    Sales    Production 
  married single   married single    married single
               
Average across all industries  79 96    78 100    82 86 
               
               
Accommodation and Food  80 96    80 102    82 85 
Administrative, Support, Waste mgmt 84 87    89 93    83 87 
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation  83 98    86 87    85 90 
Construction  76 80    69 84    85 89 
Educational Services  86 95    76 108    85 89 
Finance and Insurance  71 91    71 90    85 89 
Health Care & Social Assistance  74 93    73 107    81 84 
Information  79 91    76 93    84 88 
Manufacturing  80 93    78 95    69 70 
Other Services (no Public Adm.)  83 103    78 110    78 81 
Profess, Scientific & Tech. Services  77 94    77 93    85 89 
Public Administration  85 105    84 123    86 90 
Real Estate and Rental/Leasing  71 105    80 123    86 90 
Retail Trade  72 96    73 89    75 77 
Transportation and Warehousing  80 97    83 105    85 90 
Wholesale Trade  78 107    72 103    82 85 
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Table A3: Gender differences in earnings across industries, occupation, and marital status. 
Sample with children in the household 
(Full-time, year-round workers, % female/male median earnings ratios) 
 
   Management    Sales    Production 
  married single   married single    married single
               
Average across all industries  69  92    64 97    76 77 
               
               
Accommodation and Food  69  74    47  156    77  78 
Administrative, Support, Waste mgmt 73  155    .  .    77  78 
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation  72  37    .  .    79  82 
Construction 64  75    . .    79 81 
Educational Services  77  137    .  .    78  80 
Finance and Insurance  65  60    64  156    79  81 
Health Care & Social Assistance  69  100          73  74 
Information  68 71    85 79    78 80 
Manufacturing  74  134   69  89   63  64 
Other Services (no Public Adm.)  71  99    59  40    71  71 
Profess, Scientific & Tech. Services  69  83    .  .    77  79 
Public  Administration  79  77   67  100   79  81 
Real Estate and Rental/Leasing  64  116    62  156    79  83 
Retail  Trade  63 79    54 67    68 68 
Transportation and Warehousing  67  109   59  43   79  80 
Wholesale  Trade  66 70    72 88    75 76 
              
Note: Gender earnings ratios are missing for Administrative, Support and Waste Management, Arts, 
Entertainment and Recreation, Construction, Educational Services, Finance and Insurance, and Professional 
Scientific and Technical Services. For these industries we are unable to compute adjusted gender earnings 
gaps for the sample of never married workers in sales occupations. This is because there is not enough 
variation left in each occupation/industry/marital status cell once we control for differences in age and 
education across workers. 
 
2.  PSID Samples 
Our PSID sample pools together all the individuals in the 1994 to 2001 waves. Hence, the 
summary statistics can be interpreted as medium run averages of the relevant variables. The 
sample includes all white men and women between 25 and 54 years of age who are not in school, 
who are not in the armed forces, and who worked at least 30 hours per week and 50 weeks per 
year. We exclude workers with real weekly earnings below $67 in 1982 dollars from the sample. 
We deflate nominal variables using the CPI with base year 2000.  The information on the 
demographic variable is from the Family and Individual files. The information on hours worked, 
income, bonus, and commission is from the Income Plus files. Information on bonuses and 
commission is only available for 824 women out of approximately 3,000 women in the sample. 
Of these, 270 are never married, 426 are divorced and only 13 are married. Information on 
incentive pay is available for most of the men in the sample (5,427 out of 5,452 observations of 
which 4,349 are married.) We consider the following occupational categories: management 
positions in administration, management positions in banking, finance and in the clerical sector, 
lower level management occupations, professional occupations (engineers, architects, lawyers,   49
and medical doctors), technical occupations (in the health sector, engineering, and social 
sciences), occupations in community/social services, social scientists and university professors, 
teachers other than college professors, occupations in arts and entertainment, design, sports and 
the media, sales occupations, clerical occupations, craftsmen, operatives, physical laborers, in 
services excluding private households. We exclude from the analysis the category of laborers 
working in private households because no male reports to be employed in this occupation. 
The sample of married couples refer to male-headed households where the head of the 
household is 25-44, both spouses are white and they both work full-time year-round. There is a 
substantial variation in the number of repeated observations for each couple in our sample across 
waves of the PSID (for example only a third of the married couples that we observe in 1994 are 
still in the sample in 1995.) This entry/exit behavior can be due to a variety of reasons: divorce, 
attrition from the overall PSID sample, a change in the employment status of one of the two 
partners or lack of information on one of the variables of interest for our analysis. Hence, it is not 
meaningful to either pool together all the waves of the PSID or to take averages over the set of 
repeated observations across waves. Each cross-section of data that satisfies the sample selection 
criteria only includes a small number of observations in each wave. In order to maximize the size 
of the cross-section, we include one data point for each married couple, corresponding to the first 
year in which the couple satisfies our sample selection criteria for waves 1994-2001. We 
experimented with different sample selection criteria. For example, we considered all the 
observations in one wave, say 1999, and then added married couples from adjacent waves. The 
results obtained for these alternative samples are consistent with the ones reported in the paper. 
 
Table A4: Summary Statistics for the PSID overall sample 
      Males     Females 
    mean st.  dev.    mean st.  dev. 
Age    37.88 7.94    38.10 8.09 
Years of education  13.13 2.92    12.91 3.88 
Married     0.80  0.40  0.69  0.46 
Never married  0.09  0.29  0.10  0.31 
Widowed    0.00  0.05  0.01  0.12 
Divorced    0.09  0.28  0.16  0.37 
Separated  0.02  0.13  0.03  0.17 
Number of children  1.11  1.14  0.90  1.04 
Salary (annual)  45601 40303    28104 20889 
Log hourly earnings  2.74  0.62  2.40  0.57 
Market Hours (annual)  2,453 513    2,159 410 
Weekly hours worked  46.47 8.70    41.39 7.18 
Weeks worked   50.82 0.75    50.72 0.73 
Arts & Entertainment  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.14 
Clerical    0.05  0.21  0.29  0.46 
Social services  0.01  0.11  0.02  0.13 
Craftsmen  0.25  0.43  0.03  0.18 
Laborers (physical)  0.04  0.19  0.02  0.12 
Laborers (services)  0.06  0.23  0.14  0.34 
Lower mngmt  0.06  0.24  0.06  0.24 
Mgmt Administrative  0.13  0.33  0.06  0.24 
Mngmt bank/finance  0.01  0.08  0.04  0.19 
Operatives  0.16  0.37  0.06  0.23   50
Professionals  0.10  0.30  0.06  0.24 
Sales    0.07  0.25  0.05  0.22 
Social Scientists/Univ. Prof.  0.01  0.11  0.01  0.12 
Teachers   0.02  0.13  0.06  0.23 
Technicians  0.03 0.18    0.08 0.27 
           
Number of Observations  5452     3046   
                    
Observations with non missing incentive 
pay  5428     826  
  Average incentive pay share  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.04 
           
Observations with positive incentive pay  564     88   
  Average incentive pay share   0.10 0.13    0.07 0.11 
Share with positive incentive pay, by occupation      
 Arts  &  Entertainment  0.02  0.13  0.00  0.00 
 Clerical  0.04  0.20  0.31  0.46 
 Social  services  0.01  0.08  0.00  0.00 
 Craftsmen  0.20  0.40  0.05  0.21 
 Laborers  (physical)  0.02  0.14  0.00  0.00 
 Laborers  (services)  0.02  0.16  0.08  0.27 
 Lower  mngmt  0.08  0.27  0.08  0.27 
 Mgmt  Administrative  0.21  0.40  0.11  0.32 
 Mngmt  bank/finance  0.01  0.10  0.08  0.27 
 Operatives  0.12  0.33  0.03  0.18 
 Professionals  0.15  0.35  0.11  0.32 
 Sales  0.10  0.30  0.07  0.25 
  Social Scientists/Univ. Prof.  0.01  0.10  0.02  0.15 
 Teachers    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Technicians  0.02  0.15  0.06  0.23 
 
Table A5: Summary Statistics for the PSID sample of married couples 
    mean  st.  dev.     
                    
Age of husband  34.15  5.87     
Age of wife  32.46  6.30     
Weekly home hours of husband  8.26  9.73     
Weekly home hours of wife  16.15  10.49     
Weeks worked, husband  50.74  0.73     
Weeks worked, wife  50.70  0.71     
Weekly market hours of husband  45.87  7.98     
Weekly market hours of wife  41.60  9.83     
Labor income of husband  39615  28083     
Labor income of wife  25224  21040     
Wife/husband ratio of home hours  2.32  2.62     
Wife/husband earnings ratio  0.63  0.49     
Husband/Wife difference incentive share  -0.002  0.01     
Number of children  1.03  1.13     
         
Number of Observations  300     